Respondents utilise the "abuse of discretion" standard for all information technology's worth when defending confronting appeals, and they should. Ofttimes, it'south one heck of a shield. Just at that place are limits to relying on this standard of review, and the Court of Entreatment will reverse in appropriate circumstances.

I such case is final week's decision in McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co., case no. G049722 (fourth Dist., July 10, 2015). Plaintiff rejected ane settlement offering in this "lemon law" case, merely settled a few months later. The settlement was entered as a judgment. It required Ford to buy back the "lemon" automobile and allowed the plaintiff the option of accepting payment of $xv,000 for attorney fees or instead roll the dice with a fee motion. Plaintiff moved for almost $48,000 in attorney fees, and appealed when the trial court awarded but $28,350.

The trial court explained its honour by noting that it accounted all of the fees incurred following the plaintiff's rejection of an initial settlement offer to exist unreasonable, because the but difference in the initial offer and the settlement entered into was the provision allowing him to file an attorney fee movement. To the trial court, this indicated that the 42 hours billed to the case following the plaintiff's rejection of the earlier settlement offering "amounted to 'plaintiffs' counsel exaggerating the amount of their fees to increase their prized fees.'" (Gee, attorneys concerned about getting paid. Who'd of thunk it?)

The Court of Appeal reverses, finding fault with the trial court's reason for limiting the fee laurels. Its analysis is helpful to anyone facing the daunting "abuse of discretion" standard of review.

First, the Court of Entreatment notes that the trial court erred as a matter of law in characterizing the differences between the initial settlement offer and the eventual settlement, because (1) the trial courtroom was wrong about the get-go offering not including an option for plaintiff to take $fifteen,000 or make a fee movement; the settlement and prior offer were actually identical in this regard; and (ii) there were many other material differences non noted by the trial court. "The trial court'south erroneous comparison of Ford'southward initial compromise offer with the offer McKenzie afterwards accustomed fatally undermines its conclusion that the unabridged amount of hours billed by McKenzie's counsel in the wake of that initial offering was unjustified."

Second, the Court of Entreatment demonstrates the limits of its duty to indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the ruling:

Ford counters by first emphasizing our obligation to indulge all inferences in favor of the trial court's ruling, and pointing out the trial courtroom is not required to explain in item the footing of its fee decision. Ford urges us to construe the court's reduction of McKenzie's fee as reflecting an assessment of the usual lodestar factors considered in determining fee amounts — e.thousand., the complexity of the case, the expertise of McKenzie'due south counsel, and the early stage at which the instance was settled — and a resulting decision that $28,350.08 was simply an overall "reasonable" fee for the work performed.
Even so, while nosotros could certainly exercise that in the absenteeism of any specific analysis provided by the trial courtroom, we cannot ignore the court's reasoning when detailed in the lodge. In this case, the court was quite explicit in explaining the basis for reducing McKenzie'due south fees — rather than imposing a full general reduction on the fees requested from the outset, on the ground the rates charged by McKenzie's counsel were likewise loftier or the overall fourth dimension claimed was unreasonable given the complexity of the case, the court characterized its reduction as "based on redaction of fees for duplicated and unnecessary services and billing performed after accused's service of its CCP Section 998 offering." The court awarded McKenzie 100 per centum of the fees he requested for the period before Ford'southward initial offer, but found the entirety of "the subsequent billing was unreasonable" and excised that specific portion of the fees from McKenzie's award. When the court states its reasons explicitly, we cannot infer its do of discretion rested on a wholly different footing.

(Italics did not appear in the trial court analysis and were added past the Court of Appeal.)

In short, what the court actually did is what matters for the corruption of discretion standard. Equally the court points out, it may be impossible to know what the court actually did. Had the record in McKenzie not made clear the basis of the court'due south do of discretion, plaintiff probably would have been sunk on appeal, unless in that location was no rational footing for the amount of the award.

Having the trial court's analysis in the record made all the deviation in this case. Continue that in mind when your next fee motion approaches.